
Much of the attention on recent high-profile events at Nvidia has focused on CEO Jensen Huang’s alleged personal misconduct. This focus ignores what can be said More important details The current turbulent circumstances at Nvidia ultimately arise from export controls imposed by the US government on Nvidia’s high-end AI-powered GPUs and the Chinese government’s extraordinary efforts to try to circumvent those controls. Indeed, as discussed below, the derivative lawsuit filed by shareholders last week against Huang and Nvidia’s board highlights these geopolitical aspects of the company’s recent developments.
Nvidia’s new derivative suit is just the latest example of a D&O export control claim. A Delaware Court of Chancery derivative lawsuit filed last month against the Applied Materials Board of Directors also highlights the Company’s Board of Directors’ alleged breaches of fiduciary duties related to the Board’s oversight of export controls over a key Company product, as described below.
As these recent cases illustrate, and as discussed below, geopolitical issues, including issues arising from export controls, are an increasingly important source of directorship and directorship risk.
Nvidia derivative lawsuit
As discussed in last week’s post (here), ongoing developments involving Nvidia and its CEO Jensen Huang have already prompted a securities class action lawsuit. On November 11, 2026, shortly after the securities class action was filed, an Nvidia shareholder filed a separate shareholder lawsuit in the Northern District of California against Huang and individual members of Nvidia’s board of directors. A copy of the derivative action complaint can be viewed here.
The derivative suit complaint begins by alleging that the U.S. government treats Nvidia’s high-end GPUs “as national security assets and prohibits their export to China.” “Compliance with these export controls, and protecting the company’s technology from foreign intelligence services, is critical to Nvidia,” the complaint asserts. The complaint alleges that the company’s failure to comply with the regulations “threatens its government relations, its license to sell abroad, its reputation, and thus the value of the company.”
Despite these risks, the complaint alleges that the company’s board allowed Hwang to “maintain a romantic relationship with a senior executive at an NVIDIA customer” despite red flags that were “general and specific.” The complaint alleges that Huang “breached his duty of loyalty by concealing a conflict that put the company at risk, and by making and permitting misleading public statements.”
The complaint alleges that the other directors “breached their oversight duty by intentionally ignoring red flags about the CEO, an agent subject to an export control investigation, and a foreign intelligence threat who was intent on infiltrating NVIDIA to allow espionage for China.” The complaint seeks to recover NVIDIA’s losses and impose administrative reforms on the company.
Applied Materials Derivatives Suit
Applied Materials Derivatives Complaint, a revised version of which can be viewed herewas filed in the Delaware Court of Chancery on October 26, 2026, and arises from the circumstances that led to the February 11, 2026 Approval of Applied Materials (AMAT). Paid a fine of $252.5 million To the US Department of Commerce Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) on charges of exporting controlled technology to a Chinese company with ties to the Chinese military. The BIS claimed that the alleged illegal sales by SMIC, China’s largest chipmaker, violated the US government’s explicit ban on exporting certain equipment – ion implant devices classified as “ECCN 3B991” technology – to SMIC because of the “unacceptable risk” that “SMIC may transfer this technology to the Chinese military.”
The BIS alleged that through a secret “dual construction scheme,” AMAT moved part of its ion implant manufacturing process from Massachusetts to South Korea. This plan was allegedly carried out “only to supply one product (ion implanters) to one customer (SMIC), while AMAT continued to ship ion implanters to every other customer directly” from its Massachusetts factory. The derivative complaint alleges that sales to SMIC provided AMAT with revenues of more than $100 million annually.
The complaint alleges that documents obtained through a books and records request “support a reasonable inference” that AMAT’s board of directors “either knew of the dual construction plan to continue supplying SMIC with ion implant instruments or willfully ignored the possibility of those sales continuing.” Either way, the complaint alleges, “the facts support a conclusion that the Board (1) intentionally supported a business plan that prioritized profits over U.S. national security, or (2) intentionally ignored red flags that senior executives were racing through two giant regulatory stop signs.” The complaint alleges that the Board “breached its fiduciary duties of loyalty under Delaware law by exercising its oversight responsibilities in bad faith.”
discussion
Both recent cases show how alleged corporate responses to export controls can translate directly into D&O risks. In both cases, the complaints allege that compliance with export controls was “mission critical” for the companies involved, and further allege that the companies’ boards ignored “red flags” regarding compliance with export controls.
These latest cases are not the first D&O claims this year arising from alleged non-compliance with export controls. For example, in March 2026, as discussed herea plaintiff shareholder has filed a class action lawsuit against Super Micro Computer and certain of its executives, alleging that the company concealed that it was engaging in efforts to export high-end NVIDIA chips to China in violation of U.S. export controls.
In fact, the March 2026 securities lawsuit filed against Super Micro Computer was not even the first export control-related securities lawsuit against the company. As discussed hereIn October 2024, a plaintiff shareholder filed an export control securities class action against the company, alleging that the company misrepresented its compliance with trade control regulations restricting exports to Russia.
Also, cases involving alleged violations of export controls are not the only management and operations claims arising from geopolitical risks. For example, last month, digital brokerage platform Webull was hit with a securities class action lawsuit based on allegations that the company had misrepresented the scope of its operational relationships with China and downplayed the regulatory and geopolitical risks associated with those connections, as discussed. here. And also as discussed hereIn August 2026, US-listed Chinese internet company Alibaba was hit with a securities class action lawsuit that alleged, among other things, that the company had misrepresented risks associated with its purported status as a “Chinese military company” under US law.
There are many other areas where geopolitical risks have led to D&O claims, including, for example, trade sanctions (as discussed). here); Definitions (discuss here); Operational difficulties arising from the Iran-US War (discussed here); and anti-money laundering (discuss here). The bottom line is that geopolitical concerns have in recent months become a significant (and apparently growing) source of distribution and operational risk.
The reality is that in today’s charged geopolitical environment, companies – especially those with large cross-border operations – face a variety of complex challenges that can undermine a company’s operations and financial results. As the examples above illustrate, complications arising from these challenges can often lead to D&O claims. In addition to the above topics, there are further complexities arising from vulnerabilities in the supply chain, cross-border financial transfers, and the threat of further conflict and tension between nation-states.
Geopolitical concerns are likely to continue as an important source of D&O risk in the coming months. A particular feature of geopolitical risks is the connection with China. Readers will no doubt have noticed that many of the circumstances referred to above relate directly to China-related communications. Like Sarah Abrams He noted in a recent postHowever, these developments at least raise the question of whether China itself represents a D&O liability risk factor – not just for US-listed companies headquartered in China, but also for any company with links to China.
However, as we prepare to head into 2027, it is clear that geopolitical issues represent a significant and growing source of distribution and operational risk.
